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Introducing the element of surprise is one of the main challenges in simulator training of
in-flight emergencies. In this simulator study, we investigated the differences in
performance between predictable and surprising circumstances, in order to obtain insight
into the transfer of training between predictable training settings and surprising
circumstances in operational practice. This was done by testing twenty airline pilots who
recovered from an aerodynamic stall in two conditions: one anticipation condition and
one surprise condition. All pilots practiced beforehand using predictable, or nonsurprising scenarios. The results show that pilots had significantly more difficulties in
adhering to components of the FAA-commissioned recovery template in the surprise
condition compared to the anticipation condition. These results suggest that predictable
training may not be enough to prevent serious performance decrements under surprise.
As surprise and startle are considered to play an important role in a significant proportion of
airplane safety events, aviation authorities have mandated the introduction of surprise and/or startle in
upset prevention and recovery training (EASA, 2015; FAA, 2015). Both surprise and startle may occur in
response to unexpected events, although the former relates specifically to a cognitive mismatch between
new information and expectations (Meyer, Reisenzein & Schützwohl, 1997), while the latter refers to a
highly physiological, sudden increase in stress (Martin et al., 2015). In the case of surprise, solving the
cognitive mismatch (i.e., sensemaking) may be a mentally taxing and difficult task if one is unfamiliar
with similar situations. It may require an adaptation, or switch, of one’s cognitive “frame” (i.e.,
reframing; Rankin, Woltjer & Field, 2016). Frames are mental structures within which knowledge and
procedures are grouped, and through which information is processed and understood (Klein, Phillips,
Rall, & Peluso, 2007). Surprise is an indicator signaling that one’s presently active frame is unable to fit
with the emerging situation. This mismatch may cause the sensation of a loss of “grip” on the situation,
and the desire to explain and understand it. If the surprising situation is also startling or threatening, the
concomitant stress can be expected to impede the top-down, or goal-directed process of reframing
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007), which may further impair one’s ability to respond quickly
and appropriately (Landman, Groen, Van Paassen, Bronkhorst & Mulder, submitted). In contrast, when
an upcoming event is anticipated, sensemaking can occur beforehand. The event is then immediately
understood and less stress-evoking, which facilitates a quick and appropriate response.
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It follows that if a procedure is only trained in highly anticipated conditions, the sensemaking
activities that would be needed to identify and understand the situation before the procedure can be
applied in operational practice, are never really practiced. The current simulator study aimed to test
whether performance on a learned recovery procedure indeed suffers in surprising compared to
anticipated conditions. In addition, the experiment aimed to test whether surprise can be used in simulator
training to provide more challenging and realistic scenarios.
Several simulator studies have been published in which the effect of surprise was tested on pilot
performance of learned procedures. One study (Schroeder, Bürki-Cohen, Shikany, Gingras & Desrochers,
2014) showed that adherence to a recovery template suffered when pilots were unexpectedly exposed to a
previously practiced upset (aerodynamic stall). However, the experiment did not include a control
condition, in which the pilots’ performance was re-tested in a non-surprising scenario. Another relevant
study showed that response times were longer when a stall was pilot-initiated versus when it was
unannounced (Casner, Geven & Williams, 2013). However, this study did not include a detailed analysis
of performance. The current study adds to these previous studies by comparing the effect of surprise to
that of anticipation (manipulation check), while measuring several aspects of adherence to the recovery
template.
Method
Participants
Twenty male airline pilots participated in the study (mean age = 36.3 years, SD = 7.88; mean
flying experience: 12.4 years, SD = 5.05; 6986 flight hours, SD = 3804). Experience in operating
medium-size twinjet aircraft types was required. Eight pilots had mainly experience with the A330, five
with the B737, six with the E190 and one with the A320. All pilots were employed at the time of the
experiment, and had been on duty at least once in the week prior to the experiment. Five were currently
employed as captains, eleven as first officers and three as second officers. The pilots provided written
informed consent prior to participation and the ethics committee of the TNO Soesterberg research
institute approved the experiment.
Apparatus
The experiment was performed in the DESDEMONA flight simulator (manufactured by AMST
Systemtechnik), located at TNO Soesterberg. The cockpit mockup was styled after the Boeing 737NG,
and included the primary flight display, navigation display, engine-indicating and crew-alerting system,
and a partial mode control with flight director and autopilot mode controls. There was no overhead panel
or flight management system. Controls consisted of a yoke with control loading on pitch, rudder pedals
with rudder limiter, throttles and a stabilizer with electric trim. Flaps and speed brake were not used. The
aerodynamic model was derived from the SUPRA project (Groen et al., 2012), which extended the
aerodynamic envelope of transport category aircraft (e.g., Boeing 737NG, Airbus A321, into high angles
of attack.
Tasks and Conditions
Pilots were instructed beforehand that the simulator session would comprise two subsequent
sections of circa 20 minutes: one upset recovery section and one spatial disorientation section. They were
told that both sections were aimed at testing the simulator fidelity. In reality, the first section was used for
practice of stall recoveries, while the second section did not take place as described: it was made up to
manipulate the pilots’ expectation before the test conditions. Figure 1 displays an overview of the
experimental design. The order of the conditions was counterbalanced between pilots, and the two
resulting groups were analyzed as one.
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Figure 1. The experimental design, counterbalancing the two test conditions between two pilot groups.
The groups were added together for analysis.
Pilots received verbal instructions about the simulated aircraft model and the stall recovery
template as advised by the FAA (2015, p. 2. This involves the following steps: “1. Disconnect the
autopilot and autothrottle/autothrust systems. 2a. Apply nose down pitch control until impending stall
indications are eliminated. 2b. Use nose down pitch trim as needed. 3. Bank wings level. 4. Apply thrust
as needed. 5. Retract speed brakes or spoilers. 6. Return the aircraft to the desired flight path.” All pilots
indicated that they were familiar with these steps. The practice session, aimed at decreasing interindividual differences in skill level, consisted of the recovery of four different aircraft upsets and four
different aerodynamic stall events. All scenarios in this training session were presented in a highly
predictable and non-surprising manner, i.e., announced and explained beforehand. The final scenario of
these was repeated until the pilot was able to push down quickly and forcefully enough to avoid stick
shaker events, while also avoiding overspeed or excessive g-loads.
Unbeknownst to the pilot, the practice session transitioned into the testing section in which the
same aerodynamic stall was presented in a surprise condition and in an anticipation condition. Each test
condition was preceded and followed by three minutes of manual straight and level flight, with
autothrottle on, at 5,000 ft. and with 220 knots. In the anticipation condition, pilots were told beforehand
that the simulator operator would bring them into an aerodynamic stall when a certain landmark was
crossed. The stall was induced by creating a strong “tailwind” (decreasing the calibrated airspeed (CAS)
with 15 knots per second for five seconds), and by simultaneously adjusting the pitch trim up with 24
percent in 3 seconds time. None of the pilots reported afterwards that they were aware of any changes in
pitch trim. In the surprise condition, exactly the same stall event was induced about five seconds before
another landmark was crossed. In this case, however, pilots were instructed that the spatial disorientation
section of the experiment had started, and that they would have to do a climb-out above the landmark
while paying attention to any over-pitch sensation. In addition, their attention was taken away from the
display at the moment the stall was initiated, as they were asked to give a rating on a sickness scale
displayed to their lower right.
Outcome Variables
Flight parameters were logged from the simulator at a sample rate of 100 Hz. These flight
parameters were twice (forth and back) low-pass filtered using a 2nd order Butterworth filter with a cut-off
frequency of 2 Hz. A script was used to determine the moment of tailwind onset and the start of several
control actions in terms of autothrottle, trim, pitch, aileron and rudder control inputs. Since pitch was
continuously adjusted before stall onset, a deviation above 5 SD from the mean (taken from the preceding
period of straight and level flight) was determined to be a significant pitch control input. Using these data,
we checked whether pilots did or did not meet each of the four performance criteria (see, Table 1).
Table 1.
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Description of the four measured performance criteria, with the corresponding FAA (2015, p. 2) recovery
template principles.
Variable
C1. Disengage
autothrottle first

Corresponding
FAA principle
1

Description
Disengage the autothrottle at least 2.0 s before
significant yoke or pedal inputs.

C2. Start with pitch
down control

2a, 3

Give priority to pitch down control by starting the
recovery with pitch down control inputs. Strong
aileron inputs (> 50% of max) may not occur at
around the same moment (within 2.0 s) of pitch
down control to meet this criterion.

C3. Unload
sufficiently

2a, 6

Respond (within 2.0 s) to stick shaker events with
significant pitch down control and maintain
significant pitch down control during stick shaker
activation. Or, apply sufficient pitch down control to
avoid any stick shaker events. Keep the aircraft
sufficiently unloaded until CAS increases in order to
avoid secondary stick shaker events. Stick shaker
events were defined as secondary if they occurred
subsequent to an earlier stick shaker event, or if they
occurred after the first unloading action, i.e.,
following the first peak of pitch down control.

C4. Apply pitch
down trim

2b

Using the pitch trim to aid in pitch down control
during the recovery.

Besides measuring adherence to the recovery template, we performed a manipulation check by
asking the pilots to rate their level of surprise caused by the tailwind on a 0-10 point Likert type scale.
This was done after both conditions had ended, so as to not cause suspicion about the goal of the
experiment in the second condition.
Statistical Analysis
The effect of Condition (anticipation or surprise) on the binary performance variables, i.e.
meeting the criteria, was tested using generalized estimating equations (GEE) models of logistic
regression. To protect against an overestimation of significant differences, the outcomes were corrected
using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
The effect of Condition on the pilots’ subjective level of surprise was tested with a pairedsamples T-test.
Results
Table 2 provides an overview of the statistical differences between conditions for each of the four
performance criteria that were measured. All differences are statistically significant, with effect sizes (d)
varying from medium to large in strength, i.e., in or above the range of 0.5 to 0.8. Despite the verbal
instructions beforehand, it seems that meeting the criteria in the anticipated condition was already quite
difficult, as the proportion of pilots who adhered to the criteria was around 50-80%. Nevertheless, in the
surprise condition the proportion of pilots who met the criteria decreased with 20-30%, and with 50% in
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the case of ‘start with pitch down control’. In sum, the surprise manipulation caused a significant decrease
in adherence to several aspects of the recovery template.
The manipulation check confirmed that surprise was significantly higher in the surprise condition,
8.44 points, SD = 1.50, than in the anticipation condition, 1.39 points, SD = 2.00, Δ = 7.06, t = 12.35, p <
.001. This difference constituted a large effect size, i.e., Cohen’s d = 3.99.
Table 2.
Criteria met in the two conditions. Effect sizes (d) are calculated by transforming the odds ratio, i.e.
exp(B) from the GEE analysis, conform: Chinn (2000).
Anticipation
(met/unmet)

Surprise
(met/unmet)

Na

Δa

Χ2

p

Cohen’s
d

C1: Disengage autothrottle
early

11/9

6/14

20

-5*

5.10

.024

.69b

C2: Start with pitch down
control

16/4

6/14

20

-10*

13.41 < .001 1.23 b

C3: Unload sufficiently

10/10

5/15

20

-5*

3.94

.047

.61b

3/17

20

-6*

7.07

.008

.85 b

C4: Use trim
9/11
* Significant after Holm-Bonferonni correction.

Discussion
The results of this simulator experiment show that the unexpectedness of an simulated
aerodynamic stall effectively surprised the pilots, and negatively affected their recovery performance as
measured using four criteria derived from the FAA stall recovery template. Our results suggest that
significant decreases in adherence to learned procedures can be expected in operational practice compared
to predictable training conditions, which is in line with previous similar studies. Our control condition
shows that there is indeed a decrease in performance when pilots are surprised, thereby adding to the
study of Schroeder et al., 2014. Also, adding to the study of Casner, Geven and Williams, 2013, our
detailed measuring of performance indicates that several aspects of the recovery procedure were not
followed in the surprise condition, while our manipulation check suggests that this was caused by our
manipulation of surprise.
In the surprise condition, pilots were particularly more likely to incorrectly start their recovery
with aileron control inputs. Perhaps this was influenced by an increase in lateral instability (wing drop)
due to later responses in the surprise condition. Nevertheless, it suggests that ignoring a change in roll
angle and giving priority to pitch control (step 1 in the FAA template) may be highly counter-intuitive
and difficult to suppress, meaning that proper adherence to the FAA template in surprising situations may
be very difficult.
Overall, the results suggest that skills trained under predictive conditions may not transfer to
conditions containing an element of surprise. Hence, it may be useful to induce an element of surprise or
unpredictability when designing training methods, which allows pilots to practice with sensemaking and
switching frames and to increase their “cognitive flexibility” (Kochan, 2005). This conclusion is in line
with ICAO’s recommendation for scenario-based recurrent training: “Wherever possible, consideration
should be given towards variations in the types of scenario, times of occurrences and types of occurrence,
so that pilots do not become overly familiar with repetitions of the same scenarios.” (2013, II-1-5). By
practicing procedures under less predictable conditions, trainees learn to use the information presented by
the situation itself to identify problems, and to apply solutions. Indeed, in the training domain it has been
shown that experiencing examples of a concept in different contexts may strengthen the understanding
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(frame) relating to this concept and is thought to increase the trainee’s ability to apply the concept in
similar or novel situations (Van Merriënboer, 1997).
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